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B.: Release of Claim for Personal Injury--Right in Action as Law to A
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
action,', the effect of. which is to defeat the action as stated. 14
Applying these principles to the phraseology of the code, it is evident that a demurrer to misjoinder of parties is improper.
The statute provides that whenever the misjoinder is made to
appear by affidavit or otherwise, the misjoined parties shall be
dropped. Because of this wording, the court might treat a demurrer
as merely a notice of the misjoinder, abating the action as to improper parties, but proceeding to final judgment as to all parties
properly in the case.
J. H. H.
RELEASE OF CLAIM FOR PERSONAL INJURYAT LAW TO

Avom

IGHT IN ACTION
RELEASE BASED ON MUTUAL MIST-AKE OF FACT.-

Through the negligence of D, P, brakeman for D, was injured
February 25, 1935, while in discharge of his duties. On June 25,
1935, P for valuable consideration released D from all claims of
every kind for damages and injuries sustained. P sues for injuries
and seeks to avoid the effect of the release by alleging that at the
time the release was executed lie believed under advice of physicians, including physicians in employ of D, that his injuries were
not serious, but merely temporary whereas it later developed that
the injuries were serious and permanent. Held, that in the absence of fraud in procurement of a release of liability for personal
injuries, such release, if for valuable consideration, may not be
repudiated in an action at law by releasor for damages for the injury. Janney v. Virginian Railway Co.'
As suggested by the court in its opinion, there is a square
split of authority as to whether such a release may be repudiated
in an action at law for damages for injuries for which the release
was given. If you assume, as our court does, that there is an absolute right to relief in equity on these facts, 2 then we must con1 Tyler v. Hand, 7 How. 573, 12 L. Ed. 284 (U. S. 1849) ; F urniss v. Ellis
& Allen, 2 Brock. 14 (1822).
14 Davis Colliery Co. v. Westfall, 78 W. Va. 735, 90 S. E. 329 (1916); South
Br. R. Co. v. Long, 26 W. Va. 692 (1885); Corrothers v. Sargent, 20 W. Va.
351 (1882); Note (1921) 13 A. L. R. 1104.
1193 S. E. 187 (W. Va. 1937).
2
Atlantic Greyhound Lines v. Metz, 70 F. (2d) 166 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934);
Greer v. Fargagon Grocer Co., 168 Tenn. 242, 77 S. W. (2d) 443, 96 A. L. R.
1141 (1935). For a general discussion of the right to relief assuming it is
sought in the proper form see Notes (1907) 5 L. R. A. (N. s.) 663; (1908)
11 L. B. A. (N.s.) 201; (1914) 48 L. R. A. (N. s.) 449; (1914) 50 L.
R. A. (Y. s.) 1091; L. R. A. 1916B 776; L. R. A. 1916D 144; (1927) 48 A.
L. R. 1462. See also Comments (1928) 26 Miui. L. REv 828; (1935) 21 IowA
L. REv. 146; (1931) 15 MINN. L. REv. 805.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1938

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 3 [1938], Art. 13

WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
sider the problem as to whether it is necessary or expedient to require the inconvenience and expense of a separate suit in equity
to set aside the release.3
Those courts which require a separate suit in equity4 state
that since the law favors compromise of litigious matters a release
should be disturbed only with great caution and that equity ( s better equipped to deal with matters of mistake than a court of law.
This on the theory that the principles governing equitably procedure in such cases are better adapted to the ascertainment of
truth and the accomplishment of substantial justice.' It seems
clear that to inject the question of the validity of settlement of
plaintiff's claims for damages in an action at law where the liability
of the defendant for the injuries and the amount of the damages
sustained are also to be determined by the jury, would materially
prejudice the defendant on the latter issues' The jury would
naturally construe the settlement as an admission of liability in
the first instance. Little reason is apparant, however, for a distinction between fraud and mistake in this connection. It would
appear that further advancement of law into this equitable sphere
has been halted, for the time being at least, though the trend of
other courts seems to be towards allowing law more and more
power in such situations. Latitude as to this matter in other
jurisdictions may be accounted for in many cases by the fact that
the law judge and not the jury decides the equitable isstles raised.8
Generally no question of distinction between law and equity proceedings has been discussed and it has been expressly held in many
cases that the release might be avoided at law for mistake.' Ap3See (1935) 96 A. L. R. 1144; (1927) 48 A. L. R. 1462, 1529; L. R. A.
1916B 776, 786; MCCLINToCK, EQmrl
(1936) §§ 89, 90.
4 Greer v. Fargason Grocer Co., 168 Tenn. 242, 77 S. W. (2d) 443 (1935);
Mclsaac v. McMurray, 77 N. H. 466, 93 AtI. 115, L. R. A. 1916B 769 (1915);
Holbrook, Cabot & Rollins Corp. v. Sperling, 239 Fed. 715 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917);
Nielsen v. Portland Gas & Coke Co., 76 Ore. 505, 147 Pac. 554 (1915); Chicago
& A. R. Co. v. Jennings, 114 Ill. App. 622 (1904).
GGreer v. Fargason Grocer Co.; McIsaac v. McMurray, both supra n. 4.
6 Issue as to fraud determined by the jury in West Virginia. Norvell v. Ry.
Co., 67 W. Va. 467, 68 S. E. 288 (1910), 29 L. R. A. (xr. s.) 325 (1911);
Wendell v. Payne, 89 W. Va. 356, 109 S. E. 734 (1921).
75 WILLfSTON, CONTrACTS (1937)
§§ 1551, 1599; MCCLINTocK, EQuITY
§§ 89, 90. But see Comment (1931) 15 MmN. L. REV. 805.
8CLARE, CODE PLEADnnG (1928) § 16; 1 C. J. Actions § 184; 1 C. J. S.
Actions § 57.
9 Shook v. fli. Cent. Ry. Co., 52 C. C. A. 651, 115 Fed. 57 (1902); Malloy
v. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co., 185 Iowa 346, 170 N. W. 481 (1919); Clark v. No.
Paz. Ry. Co., 36 N. D. 503, 162 N. W. 406, L. R. A. 1917E 399 (1917) ; Touhy
v. Owl Drug Co., 6 Cal. App. (2d) 64, 44 P. (2d) 405 (1935); St. Louis, etc.
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parently a minority of courts distinguish between fraud and mistake where the right to avoid a release at law is concerned. Our
own court has in other instances placed fraud and mistake on the
same footing as to concurrent jurisdiction of law and equity though
never before considering the case of a release turning on the question of mutual mistake. 0 The court is emphatic in reaffirming
its former decisions holding that a release may be repudiated at
law for fraud and misrepresentation"' and to many it will no doubt
seem that the court is drawing an unrealistic hair-line distinction
between fraud and mutual mistake. Though it appears that the
court is acting wisely in this instance, it is difficult to conceive
of an argument which would apply in the case of mistake which
would not apply equally in the case of fraud.
A. L. B.
TAXATIoN -

Pmonrni s -

Loss OF FEDERAL TAX LmEN. -

In a

lien creditor's bill, the State of West Virginia and the government
of the United States proved claims for ta, es. The government's
claim for income tax for the year 1921 became a lien upon assessment, and was recorded as such in 1923.1 The state's claim arose
from property taxes for the year 1924. The state had enforced
its lien by a purchase of the property at a delinquent tax sale)
and the period for redemption had expired, but in disregard of
this fact, the land was sold as that of the original deliquent taxpayer. Although the state actually held title, it is content to claim
the proceeds of this sale in lieu of the property. The United States
maintains that since it had a lien on the land, it may, at its option,
follow the lien into those proceeds; and since its lien was perfected
prior to the state's claim, it has prior rights in this money. Held,
By Co. v. Cauthen, 112 Okla. 256, 241 Pac. 188 (1924), 48 A. L. R. 1447
(1927); Granger v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 194 Mis. 51, 215 N. W. 576
(1927); Note (1928) 26 Mien. L. REv. 828; Sun Oil Co. v. Hedge, 113 Ark.
729, 293 S. W. 9 (1927) ; of. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Dashiell, 198 U. S. 521,
25 S. Ct. 737, 29 L. Ed. 1150 (1904). 5 WmLISToN, CONTRACTS §§ 1551, 1599.
But see Note (1931) 15 MnN.N. L. REv. 805. Contra: note 5 supra.
lo Harman & Crockett v. Maddy Bros., 57 W. Va. 66, 49 S. E. 1009 (1905)
(distinguished by the court on the ground that the situation then merely involve.d the correction of mathematical calculation); State v. Carfer, 83 W. Va.
331, 97 S. B. 825 (1919); MeCary v. Traction Co., 97 W. Va. 306, 125 S. E.

92 (1924).
"Workman v. Casualty Co., 115 W. Va. 255, 175 S. E. 63 (1934) ; McCary
v. Traction Co., 97 W. Va. 306, 125 S. E. 92 (1924); Norvell v. K. & M. Ry.
Co., 67 W. Va. 467, 68 S. E. 288 (1910), 29 L. R. A. (x. s.) 325 (1911).
1 Recordation was in the office of the clerk of the Federal District Court
for southern West Virginia.
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